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Poverty tours—actual visits as well as literary and cinematic versions—
are characterized as morally controversial trips and condemned in the 
press as voyeuristic endeavors. In this collaborative essay, we draw from 
personal experience, legal expertise, and phenomenological philosophy 
and introduce a conceptual taxonomy that clarifies the circumstances 
in which observing others has been construed as an immoral use of the 
gaze. We appeal to this taxonomy to determine which observational 
circumstances are ethically relevant to the poverty tourism debate. 
While we do not defend all or even most poverty tourism practices, 
we do conclude that categorical condemnation of poverty tourism is 
unjustified. 
Introduction
Reality tourism in impoverished areas goes by several names; critics call it 
“poorism;” a more neutral term is “poverty tourism.”1 Articles in The New York 
1.  The term “poorism” evokes group-oriented oppression, the kind associated with 
“sexism” and “racism.” Since debates about poverty should take place on fair terms, 
we recommend that future discussions of the practice of visiting impoverished areas 
revolve around the phrases “poverty tours” and “reality tours.” If a convincing case 
can be made that poverty tours necessarily discriminate against poor people, then, and 
only then, does justification arise for using the term “poorism” to designate assessment 
of the practice. Unfortunately, present journalistic writing incites biased evaluations 
by using “poorism” to designate negative assessment of poverty tours as well as the 
practice itself. We recognize that the phrase “reality tours” can seem naïve, especially 
given the range of preconceptions about culture, class, and race that influence what 
tourists perceive and how tourists act during any kind of a tour. To minimize the likeli-
hood of being misinterpreted, we concede that tourism is a value-laden experience, 
and that generally speaking, experience of any kind is value-laden. Our point is that 
it is not contradictory to (1) endorse a value-laden conception of experience while (2) 
defending the appropriateness of conceiving of visits to impoverished areas as “reality 
tours,” because (3) our preferred designation is a comparative description. Outterson 
finds that when he brings students to a favela, they experience aspects of globalization 
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 Times (Weiner 2008), Smithsonian Magazine (Lancaster 2007), Newsweek 
(Popescu 2007), The Wall Street Journal (Moroney 2007), The Huffington Post 
(Kohn 2008), and other popular media characterize these as trips as morally 
controversial. Critics attack not just actual visits, but also virtual poverty 
tourism through film.2 In the film Slumdog Millionaire, the protagonist is an 
orphan from Mumbai’s Dharavi slum. Shyamal Sengupta, a film professor at 
the Whistling Woods International Institute in Mumbai, condemns the film for 
being a poverty tour (Magnier 2009). In the month before it won the Oscar for 
Best Picture, Slumdog Millionaire was derided as “poverty porn” in the pages 
of the London Times (Miles 2009). National Public Radio even ran a lively 
episode of “Talk of the Nation” devoted to the topic called “‘Poverty Porn’: 
Education or Exploitation?”  Are poverty tours really the moral equivalent of 
pedophiliac tourism in Southeast Asia (High 2005, 343)?
Far from being a trendy and short-lived topic of conversation, the debate 
over poverty tourism reaches back at least to Victorian London, where 
“slumming” was both vilified and celebrated, fueling both prostitution and 
significant social welfare institutions (Koven 2004). In all likelihood, poverty 
tourism is much older than critics acknowledge.   
Since most of the criticisms of poverty tourism occur in journalistic 
contexts, the leading arguments espouse personal convictions that fall short 
of the criteria that typifies scholarly debate. Indeed, most of the contributors 
to poverty tourism discourse do not reconstruct opposing views charitably. 
Perpetuating one-sided polemics, they fail to satisfy the demands of communal 
justification. Furthermore, most contributors to poverty tourism discourse do 
not comment on whether other people already have advanced similar, if not 
identical, views. Given these problems of subjectivism and redundancy, the 
poverty tourism debate requires reorientation if it is to become a topic of 
mature deliberation. 
With the hope of moving beyond the impediments just outlined, the 
purpose of this essay is to reconstruct and assess core moral issues surrounding 
poverty tourism, giving special emphasis to the most frequently cited problem, 
voyeurism (Weiner 2008, 1; Lancaster 2007, 96; Popescu 2007, 12; Moroney 
and Brazilian culture that traditional vacation itineraries render invisible. To be sure, 
what students perceive and learn while visiting a favela is mediated by a variety of fac-
tors, including their background preparation, their personalities and interests, and the 
types of exchanges that transpire during the tour. Furthermore, although the “reality” of 
the experience is constrained by the limited time-span of the tour (i.e., it is not immer-
sive like a year of study abroad), it also is heightened by visceral immediacy (i.e., it is 
not a distanced encounter with poverty, such as would be obtained through such media 
as books, newspapers, television, the Internet, etc.). None of these mediating features, 
however, detract from our claim about comparative realism.
2.  A feedback loop appears to be currently linking the virtual and the real. Chris Way, 
co-founder of Reality Tours, who proclaims that his business has increased 25% since 
Slumdog’s release (USA Today 2009).
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2007; Gentleman 2006, Kohn 2008). Not only should this reconstruction and 
assessment benefit the general public, it should also be of special interest to 
readers of Environmental Philosophy. The debates about poverty tourism 
concern judgments about conduct that takes place in a distinctive environment. 
Were that environment to lose its defining characteristics, the conduct would 
cease. Moreover, the defining features of the environment at issue makes it 
impossible to discuss poverty tourism without considering some of the main 
concerns that animate environmental justice activists and scholars. Indeed, 
the practice of poverty tourism concerns the meeting of different place-
based identities. Such identities embody differences in wealth (which effects 
opportunities for travel, education, consumption, and choice of residency), 
social privilege (which influences how “proper conduct” is understood), and 
culture (which influences conceptions of race, gender, class, individuality, 
and community). These differences readily engender situations in which 
matters of distributive justice, deliberative democracy, recognition justice, 
transformational justice, and procedural equity become salient.
This collaboratively written essay draws from different academic 
backgrounds and personal experiences. One author, Boston University law 
professor Kevin Outterson, has taken graduate students to Brazilian favelas. 
He has also taken religiously sponsored trips to colonias and garbage dumps in 
Mexico and to impoverished religious minority communities in Egypt. While 
journalistic coverage reduces Outterson’s views to titillating talking points, 
people who read articles that quote him are given less restrictive opportunities 
to judge his conduct and values. For example, The New York Times provided 
an online discussion board for readers to respond to “Slum Visits: Tourism 
or Voyeurism,” an article that quoted Outterson.3 By addressing some of the 
central points that were posted there, we are introducing overdue parity. 
The other author, Evan Selinger, is a philosopher. His training in 
phenomenology—the branch of philosophy that analyzes embodied first-
person experience—enables him to discern ambiguity and nuance in ethical 
dilemmas that mainstream discussions fail to detect. While Selinger has not 
gone on a poverty tour, his expertise in phenomenology can: (1) enhance our 
understanding of experiences that Outterson and others share, and (2) clarify 
how the poverty tourism debates revolve around phenomenological concepts 
that have been subject to more sophisticated analysis in academic literatures 
than public editorials.4 
Our essay is organized as follows. First, we describe Outterson’s experience 
of preparing law students to visit favelas, and account for the significant 
3.  Although Outterson could have entered comments on The New York Times message 
board, we should keep in mind the fact that the forum is called “Readers’ Comments.” 
4.  In drawing explicit connections between the history of phenomenology and contem-
porary debates about poverty tourism, this essay demonstrates how phenomenologists 
can make positive contributions to the multi-disciplinary field “tourist studies.”
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interactions that transpired while there. Second, we address the charge the 
debate about poverty tourism is a journalistic red herring that distracts the 
public’s attention from more pressing issues. Third, we reconstruct and assess 
the leading moral criticisms of poverty tourists that center on the allegation of 
voyeurism.
As a caveat, we should note that while we will be pursuing a deflationary 
agenda, what follows does not amount to a moral defense of most poverty 
tours that currently are being conducted. To the contrary, we acknowledge that 
many of the current tours are, in fact, morally questionable. When we defend 
poverty tourism, we do so with an eye towards a minority of actual practices 
that are structured around fairly robust educational ideals and reflexive moral 
considerations. 
1. What Happens During a Favela Tour?  Professor Outterson’s Experience
The students were nervous about the favela.  Most came from middle-class 
backgrounds from one of the poorest states in the United States. We were 
in Brazil for a three-week foreign study trip sponsored by the West Virginia 
University College of Law. The program was co-directed with a colleague, 
Professor andre cummings. For some of these students, this was their first 
trip outside the U.S. Our pedagogical goal for the foreign study program 
was to expose the students to Brazilian legal culture, forcing them to think 
more deeply about the relationship between law and society. Before we left, 
we spent two semesters exploring Brazilian history and culture, using both 
critical and conventional materials, assisted by Brazilian graduate students at 
WVU.  While in Brazil, we attended classes with students at two Brazilian law 
schools (in Rio de Janeiro and in Vitória, Espírito Santo). Most of the classes 
were comparative in focus, and we enjoyed extensive discussions with our 
colleagues.  
A favela tour was not part of the original syllabus. But a unique teaching 
moment emerged. We were staying in Ipanema, an energetic beachfront 
neighborhood in Rio. Ipanema is an expensive place to live, more residential 
and less touristy than nearby Copacabana. One key to Ipanema is the access 
to cheap labor from nearby Rocinha, a large hillside favela in Rio. It is an 
incomplete picture of Brazil to enjoy Ipanema’s beautiful beaches, hotels, and 
restaurants without seeing the poor people who make it all possible: the people 
who swept the streets at dawn, cooked the food, cleaned the rooms, and sold 
things on the beach. The danger of voyeurism and reinforcing stereotypes 
concerned me, but our students were well-prepared for this experience, and 
we would have ample academic time to process the experience critically and 
personally.
We asked for a few student volunteers to come into the Rocinha favela 
with a local operator of a poverty tour. We chose this tour because he did not 
offer a “safari” experience from a tour bus, but led small groups, on foot, with 
some connection to the community. We began with a van ride from Ipanema 
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to Rocinha, a short fifteen-minute ride across a gaping social gulf.  Rocinha 
is a hillside favela, home to perhaps 200,000 people. We ascended to the 
top of Rocinha using “motoboys”––small motorcycle taxis driven by young 
men. From the top, we walked down very small pedestrian streets for the next 
three hours, with the guide explaining his view on how the favela worked. 
We saw small shops, ate sonhas from a bakery, walked past tidy homes, 
bars, and impromptu laundries. The longest stops were at an artists’ studio 
and a community center that some donors have supported. We have returned 
several times over the years and have seen the growth of the community center 
and its programs. The guide has built some financial relationships with the 
people along the route. All undoubtedly enjoy the tourist money, but we also 
experienced something more personal.    
The guide paused several times to explain how Rocinha operates with 
very little government assistance. Basic public health facilities are modest; 
sewage runs in open gutters; water is piped in plastic pipes above ground; he 
reports that even the postal service stops at the road, and residents have to pay 
extra for delivery to their homes. For law students, many interesting questions 
follow: Do the residents own their homes? (Yes, in a practical sense.) Do they 
have legal title? (Not really, but the local community association functions 
as a semi-formal real property registry.) Is there much robbery or rape? (Not 
really, the drug gangs keep the peace unless a rival gang or the police enter the 
favela.) After three hours, we emerged at the bottom and caught vans back to 
Ipanema. For many students, it was the highlight of their time in Brazil.  
We debriefed the students afterwards to help process the experience. 
Students consistently noted that their expectations were challenged. They were 
nervous about poverty, crime, and despair and expected to encounter things 
they had seen on film. What they saw instead was community, homes, and 
dignity in the midst of poverty. They interacted with real people, instead of 
images in a film like City of God. They also improved their understanding of 
the connection between rich and poor communities, both as a local process 
and in the context of globalization. The long-term effect on the students is still 
unknown, but the post-tour seminars we held with our students were some of 
the best discussions we had in law school. Many students appear to be deeply 
affected by the experience and report the experience as valuable. 
The West Virginia program is primarily educational, and therefore may 
not be representative of poverty tourism in general. The program certainly 
can be improved. Others in Rocinha criticize the tour we took, and we have 
modest abilities to confirm many of the statements offered as “facts” along 
the tour without deeper ties to residents of Rocinha. It is possible to imagine 
ways to improve this experience for all concerned, especially for the residents 
of Rocinha. One can also find other forms of poverty tourism that would be 
easier to attack, such as “Ugly American” tours on a safari bus. We deliberately 
avoided those models. 
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2. Is the Debate About Poverty Tourism Unseemly?
Some see the debate about poverty tourism as unseemly. These critics allege 
that the debate diverts attention away from more significant moral and political 
issues, and even encourages the people who think about it to turn a blind 
eye to the injustices that affluent Western countries have committed against 
developing countries in the past and continue to commit in the present. One 
of the readers who posted a response to “Slum Visits: Tourism or Voyeurism” 
(Weiner 2009) makes this case in especially stark terms.5 The reader alleges 
that because debates about poverty tourism focus exclusively on the current 
behavior of a few individuals who are engaged in unusual activity, they (1) 
obscure the relevant large-scale issues concerning how European and the 
5.  The respondent writes: “So we go into countries (Africa, India, South/Central 
America . . . ) and colonize them: extracting the natural resources for export back to 
England, Spain, Portugal, US, where we process them and sell them back to the colo-
nies (Mercantilism=Exploitation). This goes on for several hundred years, during which 
time the colonial presence becomes entrenched in the colonized countries politically, 
economically, and culturally. Then, after the ‘West’ has fueled their industrializations 
with the wealth and sweat from the colonized countries––after they have become rich––
they all of a sudden start to become socially progressive in their views of race, equality, 
autonomy/sovereignty, and allow some of these countries to kick them out, to national-
ize, and to try and make it on their own. But they can’t because their growth has been 
stunted by centuries of colonial presence; they can’t compete in the world market. So 
the West ‘helps’ them out with loans via the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, but in the early 1980’s there is a worldwide recession that foments the ‘3rd World 
Debt Crisis’, and so we ‘help’ them out again with more loans, only now––to receive 
the loans--they have to de-nationalize their companies and sell them to corporations 
from the West, remove tariffs, reduce environmental standards, and accommodate the 
manufacturing presence and needs of the West. (So we’re back to neocolonialism). 
Then after this phase––after the West has once again enriched themselves off the sweat 
and resources of the poorer countries––we become progressive again and offer loans 
without strings, and the forgiveness of debts. So what does all this mean? It means that 
we in the West got the head start on industrialization, technology, and weapons manu-
facture, we used this advantage to exploit the countries we colonized, and most of these 
countries have never been able to recover. They are like dogs at their master’s table––
looking for whatever crumbs they can get (tourism for instance). And now, we like to 
have trite discussions about whether some type of tourism is ‘ethical’ or not. Please. The 
only reason we care is because of the affluence bubble in which we live, and this is/was 
subsidized by the very barrios/colonias/slum conditions that this discussion is about. 
In other words, if it weren’t for these conditions, we wouldn’t be having this discus-
sion. Those slums have given us what we have. The point? If you take away our wealth 
and comfort, we don’t care anymore about things like this. Donations? Contributions? 
What’s that going to do? How about all Americans becoming amenable to lower stan-
dards of living so that some of these other countries have a chance to get ahead. How 
about the American corporations all of a sudden become altruistic and giving?  If white, 
upper-middle and upper-class Americans had to significantly reduce their standard of 
living all hell would break lose, and a discussion like this--luxury that it is--would be 
utterly insignificant” [sic] (spelling corrected).
7thE EthicS Of POvErty tOuriSm
United States policies have been and continue to be responsible for creating 
global inequality, and (2) obscure the rationalizations that Europeans and 
Americans offer to justify why they are not willing to further global justice by 
accepting a lower standard of living.6 
We acknowledge the importance of questions concerning what obligations 
are entailed by “backwards-looking” (e.g., potential rectification) and 
“forwards-looking” (e.g. potential compensation) dimensions of justice at 
the large-scale. Nevertheless, we suggest that debates about poverty tourism 
actually enrich discussions about global ethics. Globalization reduces the 
difficulty and cost for tourists to travel the world—in both virtual (e.g., 
via Internet and film) and more robustly corporeal (e.g., via air and ground 
transportation) ways. If we take global tourism as a given, then it becomes 
increasingly important to determine which values and ideals should guide a 
traveler’s conduct. The importance of providing careful ethical reflection on 
tourist conduct is heightened by the fact that the present is marked by the 
growth of “tourism reflexivity,” a concept that sociologist John Urry defines 
as “the set of disciplines, procedures, and criteria that enable each . . . place 
to monitor, evaluate, and develop its ‘tourism potential’ within the emerging 
patterns of global tourism” (2001, 2). The combination of ease of travel, 
enhanced tourism reflexivity, persistence of differences in cultural practices, 
and changes in material culture make it likely that the foreseeable future will 
be plagued by normative concerns related to tourism, especially as it relates to 
6.  Such a view resonates with claims that political philosopher Thomas Pogge (2005) 
advances in the context of articulating his “negative duties” approach to human rights. 
Pogge defines “negative duties” as “duties not to expose people to life threatening pov-
erty and duties to shield them from harms which we would be actively responsible” (6). 
Specifically, Pogge identifies two attitudes as root causes of why worldwide poverty has 
not been eradicated, even though the “problem is hardly unsolvable” (1). The first at-
titude is that “citizens of rich countries are . . . conditioned to downplay the severity and 
persistence of world poverty.” The second attitude is that most people think of world 
poverty “as an occasion for minor charitable assistance.” Pogge contends that cultural 
conditioning reinforces these attitudes, including biased economic perspectives that cir-
culate throughout public sphere discourse. Crucially, Pogge insists that leading voices 
in Europe and America promote the message that “severe poverty and its persistence 
are due exclusively to local causes” while obscuring the truth that “severe poverty is an 
ongoing harm we inflict upon the global poor” (1). From Pogge’s perspective, much of 
the prosperity that wealthy nations currently enjoy came about through violent histories 
of destruction, oppression, and colonialism. While Pogge does not believe that citizens 
should be blamed for the conduct of their ancestors, he does maintain that nobody is 
entitled to profit from the “fruits of [our forefathers’] sins,” especially as concerns the 
“huge advantages” that some countries have over the global poor (2–3). Ultimately, 
Pogge’s argument in favor of restitution for unjust enrichment remains contentious be-
cause it is not endorsed by those who favor the widely purveyed notion that govern-
ments have an overriding moral obligation to serve the “national interest.”
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matters of poverty, indigenous rights, natural resource use, and biodiversity. 
Comprehensive analysis of global justice requires analyzing poverty tourism.7
In anticipation of possible objections, let us note that we would be willing 
to withdraw our claim about the merits of poverty tourism discourse if someone 
were to establish that: (1) the public is capable of cognitively processing only 
a single debate about global justice at a time, or (2) debating poverty tourism 
diminishes how the public addresses pressing matters of global justice. 
With respect to (1), no empirical evidence exists that validates the 
patronizing charge that discussions of poverty tourism detrimentally 
monopolize public attention. To be sure, good reasons exist for being skeptical 
about how informed the general populace is on a number of issues that are 
central to social welfare. Nevertheless, such skepticism only validates the 
argument being made by sociologist Harry Collins who insists that better tools 
need to be developed for analyzing the role that technical expertise should play 
in policy formation (Collins and Evans 2007). That is, while the public can 
entertain multiple policy issues, the level of technical detail surrounding any 
one of them may be beyond the scope of what the average person can grasp.
Likewise, no compelling logical, conceptual, or causal relation has been 
established that validates (2). Now, a bias may very well exist that inclines 
the general public to view responsibility primarily as a matter of assessing 
individual conduct, and not judging institutional structures and collective 
behavior. Anthropologist Allan Hanson makes a compelling case that this bias 
exists because assumptions related to “methodological individualism” have 
informed historical conceptions of responsibility (Hanson 2008). But even if 
such bias is pervasive, partisans can enhance discussions of responsibility by 
framing the debate over poverty tourism as an issue that remains contentious 
largely because large-scale issues of global justice have not been satisfactorily 
addressed.    
7.  Sensitized to the disciplining power of technology, Urry’s analyses of tourism in-
clude fascinating observations about how access to different technologies can change 
the very “nature” of what he calls the “tourist’s gaze.” For example, Urry approvingly 
cites nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s observation that the 
development of the mobile railway “annihilated space” by encouraging travelers to 
view landscapes through “panoramic perception” in which sights are meant to taken 
in quickly and not “lingered over, sketched or painted or in any way captured”; this 
experience is also conducive to perceiving an “enormous sense of vastness, of scale, 
size and domination of the landscape” (2001, 4). Urry further shows how other modes 
of transportation likewise discipline perception, as does access to different media for 
recording travel experiences. In the spirit of Urry’s analysis of technological mediation, 
we can note that because contemporary tourists often travel with digital cameras that 
enable them to take voluminous amounts of pictures without worrying about financial 
costs (as was the case when analogue photographs had to be chemically processed to be 
seen), the very technology of representation encourages tourists to take up distinctive 
attitudes towards representation.
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3. The Charge of Voyeurism
Poverty tourists regularly are denounced as immoral voyeurs, and the charge 
of voyeurism has fueled the recent debate over audience response to Slumdog 
Millionaire. As mentioned in the Introduction, critics like Shyamal Sengupta 
condemn the film for being a poverty tour; Alice Miles labels it “poverty porn.” 
Are state universities and church groups engaged in the global pornography 
business?  
Since critics presuppose different meanings when they use the term 
“voyeur,” it can be difficult to assess which of their appraisals, if any, are valid. 
Moreover, inadequately formulated theses tend to accompany the prevalent 
linguistic impression. To overcome these impediments, we proceed by: (1) 
providing a taxonomy of the circumstances in which observing others has been 
construed as an immoral use of the gaze; and (2) appealing to this taxonomy 
to clarify which observational circumstances should be deemed relevant to the 
poverty tourism debate. 
       
3a. Taxonomy of Voyeurism
No one argues that it is inherently demeaning to look at others.  That view 
would be so extreme as to be the expression of deep pathology. However, some 
contexts of observation are seen as morally troubling. Claims about immoral 
behavior have been leveled at the following scenarios:
1. Immoral voyeurism occurs when undetected glances invade other 
people’s privacy and take advantage of their vulnerability.
 
2. Immoral voyeurism occurs in some instances where people perceive 
that they are being observed for demeaning purposes.
 
3. Immoral voyeurism occurs when observers are motivated to look at 
others to further demeaning ends.
 
4. Immoral voyeurism occurs in some instance where observers are 
dishonest about their reasons for observing others.
5. Immoral voyeurism occurs in some instances where the mere presence 
of a distinctive group of observers makes people who are observed and not 
members of that group feel demeaned.
 
6. Immoral voyeurism occurs in some instances where members of a 
privileged group misrepresent the values and beliefs of an underprivileged 
group on the basis of selective observations of their lives.
 
7. Immoral voyeurism occurs when people view inappropriate events and 
images.
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In the next three sections we clarify what each of these contexts entails and 
discuss whether they apply to the poverty tourism debates.
3b. Voyeurism and the Undetected Glance
Let us start by examining the first charge that immoral voyeurism occurs when 
undetected glances invade other people’s privacy and take advantage of their 
vulnerability. The tradition of existential phenomenology provides us with 
some insight into this issue, especially a frequently cited passage of Being and 
Nothingness (1943 [1966]) in which Jean-Paul Sartre describes his experience 
of being startled by a walker’s approaching footsteps as he covertly peeps 
at someone through a keyhole in a door. Sartre emphasizes feeling shame 
and suggests that the emotion is triggered by recognition that his gaze took 
advantage of another’s vulnerability: “It is shame which reveals to me the 
Other’s look and myself at the end of that look. It is shame . . . which makes 
me live, not know the situation of being looked at” (352). In characterizing the 
situation of shame as one that is “lived” and not “known,” Sartre makes the 
anti-intellectualist point that his recognition of harm does not occur via an inner 
monologue that is expressed in propositional form. Rather, the recognition 
occurs in the visceral experience of a stinging emotional state.  
In identifying emotional experience with moral awareness, Sartre appears 
to be suggesting that non-pathological people inevitably will feel deserved 
shame if they find themselves caught (or on the verge of being caught) being 
“Peeping Toms.” However, at the time that Being and Nothingness was written, 
Sartre had not yet fully clarified the moral dimensions of existentialism. One 
way to attribute a moral interpretation to Sartre’s description of voyeurism 
is to follow a line of thinking that Leon Kass, a contemporary bioethicist, 
advances. In Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity (2002) Kass refers to 
emotional expressions of a distinct class of moral judgments as the “wisdom 
of repugnance.” As Kass sees it, certain negative emotional responses offer 
evidence that an action or characteristic is intrinsically bad. In differentiating 
the evidentiary statuses of reasoned and emotional responses to moral harm in 
“crucial cases,” he goes so far as to privilege emotional attunement: “In crucial 
cases . . . repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond 
reason’s power fully to articulate it” (150).
Deep debate exists as to whether intuitive moral judgments of the sort 
designated by Kass are objective, or whether they merely reflect the contingent 
values that subjects internalize through cultural discipline. We will return to 
this issue in the next section. For now it suffices to note that the context under 
review does not apply to the poverty tourism debates. If poverty tourists are 
guilty of any moral infractions, these infractions occur in contexts where poor 
people realize that they are being observed. No one is accusing poverty tourists 
of engaging in surreptitious peeping.                 
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3c. Voyeurism and Demeaning Ends
We turn now to second and third contexts in which voyeurism has been seen 
as immoral: instances where people perceive that they are being observed for 
demeaning purposes, and instances where observers are motivated to look at 
others to further demeaning ends. The following reader comments on “Slum 
Visits: Tourism or Voyeurism” (Weiner 2009) are illustrative examples of how 
critics see both of these contexts as applicable to the poverty tourism debates:
 
[Poverty tourism] is simply the racist Othering of post-colonial societies by a 
metropolitan elite. It treats individuals as objects in a zoo, not as empowered 
agents.8 
I lived in Mumbai in 2003, close to the world trade center in a large and 
beautiful residential tower. It was only a couple of streets away from the 
nearest slum and the people that lived there were essentially the “support 
staff” of the wealthy who lived in the towers. They were cleaners, cooks, 
garbage collectors, elevator operators and street sweepers, keeping the district 
and its wealthy residents in tip top shape. I was always fascinated with the 
slums of Mumbai and would walk my shirts down to the local ironing men, 
on the edge of the slum to have them pressed.  One day, my curiosity got 
the better of me and instead of handing over the clothes and turning back, 
I headed in, winding my way through the tiny lanes. I hadn’t been walking 
for two minutes when a young man stopped me—and in halting English 
asked me what I was doing there. I said I was just walking and looking. He 
looked at me, then at the ground and replied, madam, you not see this. In an 
instant I was looking at the ground. I apologized, turned on my heel and left. 
My curiosity got the better of me, I wanted to see inside those homes, look 
through the doorways, see what “they” did in there. I didn’t think about their 
dignity, that these shacks were someone’s home. I would never walk through 
a neighborhood in the US to see how the people lived, to look through their 
doors, to see what “they” did in there. That young man taught me something 
about myself that day, I thank him for it, and I will never forget him.9 
In “Shocked by Slumdog’s Poverty Porn,” Times Online columnist Alice Miles 
clarifies how the third context extends beyond the initial poverty tourism 
debates to other contexts of where poverty is observed.
As the film [Slumdog Millionaire] revels in the violence, degradation and 
horror, it invites you, the Westerner, to enjoy it, too. Will they find it such fun 
in Mumbai? Like the bestselling novel by the Americanised Afghan Khaled 
Hosseini, A Thousand Splendid Suns, Slumdog Millionaire is not a million 
miles away from a form of pornographic voyeurism. A Thousand Splendid 
Suns is obsessed with rape and violence against women, the reader asked 
8.  We corrected the misspellings found in the original text.
9.  We made some minor formatting changes in the original text.
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to pore over every last horrible detail. Slumdog Millionaire is poverty porn. 
(Miles 2009) 
Many people suggest that poverty tourists treat poor people as “as objects 
in a zoo, not as empowered agents” (Weiner 2009). Unfortunately, most of 
these denunciations fail to clarify whether they are stating that poverty 
tourists intend to demean poor people, or whether poor people feel demeaned 
when observed by tourists. There is an important difference between the two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the problem lies with the tourists’ intentions, 
and we note our agreement with those who believe it is immoral for tourists to 
go on poverty tours in order to demean the poor. An elaborate justification of 
this condemnation is not necessary, given how easily different moral theories 
justify condemning the intention to demean marginalized people. However, 
we would add that no evidence exists that all poverty tourists or even a high 
percentage of poverty tourists have such despicable motivations. Crucially, it 
is an open empirical question as to how frequently such ill intentions exist. 
Critics thus are not justified in equating the practice of poverty tourism with 
immoral intention.  
A problem similar to the confusion of likely with inevitable intentions 
plagues Miles’s denunciation of Slumdog Millionaire and A Thousand Splendid 
Suns. Miles presumes that since these artworks graphically depict violence 
against poor people, well-off audiences will be inclined to experience them with 
a sense of Schadenfreude. Now, Miles correctly recognizes that information 
often is structured in a non-neutral manner that “invites” viewers to respond 
in patterned ways. Recently, this thesis about constrained intentionality has 
extended beyond philosophical circles—where debates occur about Don Ihde’s 
phenomenological conception of “technological mediation”—to mainstream 
understanding through the widespread reception of Cass Sunstein and Richard 
Thaler’s jointly authored book, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness (2008). In this text, the legal scholar and behavioral 
economist appeal to such concepts as “choice architecture” and “default 
settings” to challenge readers to think about how design configurations 
interact with our perceptual and cognitive systems so as to “nudge” us in 
biased directions. They make their point by discussing a range of provocative 
examples, ranging from fly-etched urinals in the men’s restrooms at Schiphol 
Airport (that minimize spillage) to strategically arranged cafeteria displays 
(that incline kids to select healthy food). They also feature insightful studies 
about how the format in which information is presented influences people’s 
decisions, including which mortgages and medical insurances they select, how 
much money they save, and which investments they target.
The problem here is that Miles’s cinematic and literary examples bear 
little resemblance to the instances of informational “nudging” that Sunstein 
and Thaler emphasize. By characterizing Slumdog Millionaire and A Thousand 
Splendid Suns as “poverty porn,” Miles implies that the depictions of violence 
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against poor people there are so sensationalized as to likely arouse the vile 
viewer/reader response of enjoying the depicted miseries. Contrary to this view, 
we contend that neither logical nor empirical necessity supports such a cynical 
link between the content of violent media (of this kind) and the perceptions 
of those who view violent media (of this kind). The only response that can 
be reasonably inferred to follow from exposure to such emotionally powerful 
content is an emotionally powerful response. Of course, it could be argued 
that in a culture typified by widespread sadism, those emotions are readily 
expressed as pleasure in the other people’s pain. But while some cultural critics 
identify U.S. culture with a sadist sensibility, we find that such a sweeping 
generalization is too reductive to be informative. It is more useful to posit 
that while some people will, in fact, feel better about their privileged lives as 
a result of being exposed to these stories, others will feel sympathy for the 
victims that these stories portray. Knowing that sympathetic viewers of these 
media do exist, the well-respected non-profit organization Save the Children is 
using Slumdog Millionaire as an educational tool to raise awareness of global 
poverty. In short, then, Miles does not provide good reasons for assuming the 
perverse response.
In fact, Miles’s criticism does not become any more persuasive if we 
reconstruct it as a point about the ontological differences that distinguish film 
from reality. To be sure, movies like Slumdog Millionaire are heavily-edited, 
contrived, aestheticized, and replete with scenes that blend historical fact with 
cinematic fiction. Furthermore, the expectations that spectators bring to movies 
can differ from their expectations of real life events because their past movie 
experiences influence their current ones, exacerbating disciplined responses to 
artificial stimuli. Nevertheless, for all of these differences, it still remains the 
case that no compelling causal forces impinge upon viewers that incline them 
to respond in the objectionable manner that Miles identifies.   
The second scenario concerning how poor people respond to being 
observed suffers from the same problem as the first. It also conflates possible 
with actual intentions by presuming that poor people necessarily must feel 
demeaned when observed by tourists. As the reader’s comment about visiting 
Mumbai in 2003 establishes, some poor people do feel that being observed 
demeans their existence. Nevertheless, it is presumptuous to assume that all 
poor people necessarily must feel demeaned when observed by or interacting 
with tourists. Such presumptuousness is ironic because it actually deprives 
poor people of the very “agency” that it intends to safeguard. To this end, 
one of the readers of “Slum Visits: Tourism or Voyeurism” (2009) leveled 
moral accusations at the author, journalist Eric Weiner, and commentators who 
condemned poverty tourists as immoral voyeurs without actually consulting 
with the poor people who were observed and supposedly harmed. The 
following response is illustrative:
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Here’s a really novel idea. To New York Times reporters like Eric Weiner, the 
tourists, tour organizers and all you fine folks who are commenting. Why not 
ask the residents themselves? This article appeared not to interview a single 
resident to ask their opinion on tourism vs. voyeurism. Nor has anyone in the 
commentary suggested that the article should have done so. Even those who 
are arguing for residents’ dignity. Failing to grant residents’ the agency of 
making that choice is the greatest transgression.  Shame on all of you.10 
The indignation expressed in this passage conveys a criticism central to 
environmental justice: Without the guarantee of participatory parity, ethically 
justified skepticism can be conveyed at any claim made by a privileged group 
about the identity or beliefs of an underprivileged group.
Having agreed that it is immoral for people to go on poverty tours with 
the intent of demeaning others, having rejected the thesis that one can make 
valid a priori assumptions about the intentions of poverty tourists and readers 
of poverty media, and having rejected the thesis that one can make valid a 
priori assumptions about how poor people feel about being observed, we now 
have to address the matter of what judgments are appropriate to the cases 
where poor people do feel demeaned by being observed. Should tourists in this 
circumstance feel the shameful “wisdom of repugnance” akin to the experience 
had by a person who looked at the ground in shame after realizing that a poor 
person felt it was inappropriate of him/her to be in the slums of Mumbai? Does 
it matter, morally speaking, that he/she did not intend to be demeaning?
Both effect and intention should matter, in different ways. Some people 
will feel demeaned by some poverty tourists, while others will not. This is an 
empirical question, but to the extent that people do not actually feel demeaned, 
the objection fails. For those who do feel demeaned, we might ask whether all 
poverty tourists would elicit the same response to the same degree. Perhaps 
the objection is not to poverty tours as such, but only badly executed poverty 
tours, just as some tourism has a much larger carbon footprint than others. This 
is a helpful exercise, as it makes us ask what aspects of poverty tourism elicit 
the strongest negative reactions from the residents or does the greatest harm 
to everyone involved. The next question then becomes how the tours could be 
modified to reduce or eliminate the harm.
As for intention, few would defend a tourist who was intentionally 
demeaning another person. To stay on point, we will make the simplifying 
assumptions that the remainder either have good intentions (the road-
paving kind) or perhaps are clueless. Either way, when confronted with the 
unintended demeaning effect of their actions, these tourists and tour operators 
will have an opportunity. They can continue to act in the face of what is now 
a known harm (and become an intentionally demeaning tourist) or they can 
10.  This caveat about the dangers of elites representing marginalized people is a long-
standing concern in postcolonial studies, and one of us has even written about it in the 
context of discussions of the Indian Dalit. See Amit Ray and Evan Selinger (2008).
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modify their behavior with the intention to reduce the harm. Whether they 
are successful in the latter is again an empirical question, which might 
trigger an iterative action/reaction process. This process is a path to ethical 
improvement in tourism practices, if well executed. Crucially, the path opens 
up new opportunities for transformative justice as it can engender new forms 
of respect, new configurations of political relations, and changes in how power 
and agency are expressed. Ideally, participatory parity will be enhanced, and 
tourists will be more responsive to local conceptions of acceptable behavior, 
including behavior related to responsible times for travel, responsible terms of 
identification, and responsible norms of interaction.
One troubling assumption in this discussion is that the communities are 
homogeneous in their reaction to poverty tourism. Perhaps most residents of 
Rocinha are indifferent about the tourists; some are obviously pleased to see 
them. But what if one person is terribly upset by it? Is that enough to veto the 
visit? What if just one person is mildly annoyed by the tour?  
At this point, we look for individual answers in contract, and community 
answers in democratic consent. Certainly, if the residents have made a bargain 
(a sale, as in the artists’ studio in Rocinha), some of the objections fall away. 
No one forced them to sell goods or services to the tourists, but having done 
so, they are not well positioned to complain that they feel demeaned by the 
transaction. Some might say that the concept of consent is invalid in the context 
of gross inequality, that residents who sell to tourists are coerced by the extreme 
wealth gap into a transaction that demeans them. Such arguments are leveled 
at consensual sex workers and capitalism in many contexts. We acknowledge 
this argument but will not address it here, as it applies in many contexts well 
beyond poverty tourism. In any event, the vast majority of Rocinha residents 
do not consent by contract to poverty tourism, nor do they benefit directly. 
Perhaps consent (or the absence of dissent) derived from the community 
through customary or democratic processes can bridge the gap. If a tour has 
permission from the community’s legitimate leaders, or is otherwise permitted 
under local law and custom, then we might overlook the mild annoyance of the 
solitary objector. That person’s difficulties have been weighed in the balance 
and found wanting; not by an external value system or neocolonial power, but 
by the legitimate and internal governance system in the community itself. And 
if that is true for the mildly annoyed, it is also true of the deeply disturbed 
minority, so long as the legitimacy of the leadership structure can bear the 
weight of the aggrieved minority.  
In short, the consent of the community matters greatly, and complaints 
and suggestions from residents and their leaders should shape poverty tour 
practices. The absence of formal consent should not hinder tourism, so long 
as the community is not objecting. A legitimate community decision to ban 
tourists should be respected, and a visit in violation of that ban would be 
unethical. Identifying a “legitimate” decision is more difficult. 
Democratic structures have the capacity to evaluate the relative merits 
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of restrictions on travel and tourism. In the United States, those opposed to 
freedom of travel bear a heavy burden to justify restricting such a fundamental 
right, which encourages us to operate with the presumption that consent is not 
needed until objections are voiced. As Gregory Hartch stated, “the right to 
travel has been recognized by American courts for more than 150 years” (1995; 
457, 459). It was the first fundamental right recognized under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The right to travel is fundamental to our national conception 
of freedom: “The rule of open travel on the roads was viewed as superior to 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of press throughout the 
late 1800s” (Roots 2005; 245, 249). “[T]he constitutional right to travel from 
one State to another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our 
Federal Union. . . . A right so elementary was conceived from the beginning 
to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created” 
(United States v. Guest 1966, 745, 757–58). The right to travel is an important 
component of personal autonomy. While the consent and participation of the 
community are ethically valuable, the mere absence of formal consent should 
not block the right to travel until legitimate objections are raised.  
In the context of Rocinha, we have serious concerns about community 
consent, given the quasi-governmental role played by the drug traffic gangs, 
together with their erstwhile allies, the residents’ associations. These institutions 
suffer significant democracy deficits, and yet one would be hard pressed to 
point to alternative institutions in a better position to govern Rocinha. In any 
event, the tours occur only because the gangs and the residents’ associations 
tacitly allow them to continue.  
3e. Voyeurism: Contexts 4–7
There is not much to say about the fourth context in which immoral voyeurism 
is said to occur. If poverty tourists are dishonest about their intentions, they 
deserve moral rebuke. For example, we should consider tourists to be morally 
reprehensible if they proclaim motivation to learn more about poverty, but 
in fact their guiding intention is to acquire life experience that will make for 
interesting party stories, or to make a profit (using the funds only for personal 
benefit) by selling pictures of suffering people once home. Because this 
judgment can be justified by a variety of moral outlooks, it does not require 
elaborate justification.
The next context, however, calls for more nuanced considerations. It is 
quite possible that the mere presence of tourists will make poor people feel 
demeaned, even if the tourists have good intentions. This issue might tilt the 
balance towards virtual poverty tourism, especially through film, if the primary 
harm is the demeaning presence. In Rocinha, several tour operators lead small 
tour groups every day. With a documentary film, the intrusion would occur 
just once. Of course, documentary films are exactly what send some tourists 
to the favela, sometimes with false impressions. Likewise, the New York 
Times article will undoubtedly spur some interest in these tours; some will go 
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with inaccurate expectations.Leaving the question of virtual versus physical 
tourism unresolved for the moment, let us consider the underlying claim about 
demeaning presence. The following responses to “Slum Visits: Tourism or 
Voyeurism” (Weiner 2009) defend the thesis that the tourist’s gaze demeans 
the dignity of the poor people who are observed because poor people are a 
marginalized group.
Why a rich person would pay someone to drive them around my neighborhood 
is beyond me. Imagining a red double-decker tour bus circling Hunts Point 
and surrounding neighborhoods would be more an oddity first, and after a 
while, anger. It would make me angry, if while I’m walking to the market 
with my children, to buy what groceries I can afford this week with my 
ever decreasing food stamp allotment, to see a group of wind tousled, pastel 
wearing tourists with cameras slung about their necks.11
This kind of “tourism” of poverty is disgusting in its reliance on power 
differentials. If you visit rich neighborhoods and gawk at the people living 
there, chances are they have the means (if not the desire) to gawk at you. 
Day tours into the poorest places of the world, whatever country, appall me. 
“Mission” trips—teenagers spending $1,000 to go put in a few days work in 
exchange for a resume-booster—are no better.
Are these privileged people really so unimaginative and shallow that they 
have to see poverty to know that it exists? And do they really think that their 
“changed” perspective justifies the damage done by their travel (because 
foreign poor people are generally so much hipper than the ones under the 
bridge when you drive home from work)?
The guiding idea in these responses is that poverty tourism is an 
unacceptable form of voyeurism because it displays an asymmetric presence 
that reinforces social stratification. The following sociological features are 
relevant to this issue: poor people cannot take a comparable tour of a rich 
neighborhood; poor people who work in resorts are instructed not to make eye 
contact with rich guests; despite the legality of free-association, poor people 
have been rounded up by the police for being in neighborhoods they do not 
“belong” in; and the conspicuous consumption of rich tourists can serve as a 
painful reminder of how much better off others are. For the reasons expressed 
in the previous section, no one is justified in assuming, a priori, that the 
presence of tourists must induce the harm and resentment that these quotes 
detail. However, it is empirically possible that poor people will feel this way 
about being observed, regardless of the tourist’s intentions.  
In the context of Rocinha, some of these concerns may not be well 
grounded. The theory of asymmetric presence as a damaging force loses power 
if you spend a few days watching television in Rocinha. Brazilian television is 
11.  We made small stylistic changes to this quote.
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ubiquitous in favelas, and wealth is prominently on display. If it is harmful for 
Rocinha residents to be confronted with wealth and inequality, poverty tours 
are not the primary cause. Likewise, the assumption that Rocinha residents 
cannot take a comparable tour of wealthy areas does not fit well with the 
Brazilian context. Many of the residents of Rocinha work in the homes and 
businesses of Ipanema. They travel by public transit every day to the homes 
and workplaces of very wealthy people. We are not defending the income 
inequality in Brazil, but merely stating the obvious: income inequality is not 
news to Brazilian favela residents. Nor would a Hollywood-style tour of the 
homes of the rich and famous do much to restore the moral balance.
Perhaps the argument is that Rocinha is a refuge for the poor, and should be 
protected as a safe haven from social difference. This is a plausible argument. 
In other contexts, such as that of Native Americans, certain areas are preserved 
for the tribal members from external intrusions. If Rocinha’s community 
leadership took such a position, then it would be entitled to respect. But the 
mere presence of inequality (absent other compelling circumstances) should 
not create a zone of non-autonomy around the poor and their communities, 
preventing other people from exercising their autonomy, including the right 
to travel.
The sixth context in which immoral voyeurism is said to occur are 
instances where members of a privileged group misrepresent the values and 
beliefs of an underprivileged group on the basis of selective observations of 
their lives. The phenomenological tradition presents rich insights into this 
issue, and we can gain clear sense of its basic parameters by reflecting on a 
summary presentation of the concepts of the “male gaze” and the “racial gaze.” 
In her feminist classic The Second Sex (1949), Simone de Beauvoir—
Sartre’s longstanding partner and collaborator—argues that women are defined 
as inferior “others” in male-dominated cultures and socially disciplined to 
accept their second-class status as a natural state of affairs. By extending de 
Beauvoir’s insights into the social construction of gendered identity, feminist 
scholars learned how to analyze a range of representations—including 
photography, cinema, painting, and even the history of philosophy itself––as 
manifestations of a “male gaze.”  This reductivist gaze is defined by its tendency 
to view women not as subjects, but as eroticized and fetishized objects. It is 
identified as a leading cause underlying degrading depictions of women’s lives, 
beliefs, and values—depictions that unduly demean their political, moral, and 
aesthetic worth, and which disregard the adverse psychological and social 
consequences that result from such abjection. By the 1980s, Laura Mulvey’s 
conception of “Woman as Image, Man as Bearer of the Look”—a section title 
found in her frequently cited essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” 
(1975)—became an organizing principle of much feminist and cultural studies 
scholarship. 
In his seminal Wretched of the Earth ([1961] 2005), Franz Fanon offers a 
forceful articulation of the idea of a “racial gaze.” This idea is so powerful that 
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in the Preface Sartre himself writes: “The Third World finds itself and speaks 
to itself through his [Fanon’s] voice.” *AUTHORS: PAGE #*
As Teodros Kiros reminds us, Fanon explored the concept of the “racial 
gaze” by examining how “the black person is not only burdened by geography, 
history, and place” but also “most particularly saddled with the heavy weight 
of difference, difference exacted by the idea of race” (Kiros 2006, 216–17). 
Fanon contends that white people routinely look at black people with a gaze 
that emerges from a dangerous “double consciousness.” According to Fanon, 
the white racist who condemns black skin and African cultures simultaneously 
“secretly desires their black bodies and ways of doing things” (218). Fanon 
insists that when black people begin to understand this paradox of desire and 
repulsion, they take a crucial step in developing an emancipatory psychology 
rooted in black pride.
This is a potentially damaging critique of poverty tourism, especially if the 
visits are superficial and poorly rooted in context––the “safari bus” rides again, 
now saddled with the “bourgeois gaze.” Agencies serving the homeless in the 
U.S. are frequently inundated with requests for groups to provide dinner on 
Thanksgiving Day, but a dearth of volunteers in other months. Many challenge 
these holiday efforts as shallow and transient.
Poverty tours are certainly exposed to the real possibility of superficiality 
and reinforcing of stereotypes. But all superficial experiences are not equally 
problematic. In the United States, many Native American tribes host gambling 
casinos, legally permitted because the tribes have some autonomous legal 
authority. At some of these casinos, one will occasionally find a performance, 
replete with Native dancing and dress. In Boston, one can view an exhibition of 
Irish step dancing; in Houston, a rodeo; colonial re-enactments in Williamsburg; 
in Harlem, jazz and blues on Saturday night and Black gospel choirs on Sunday 
morning. Perhaps some of these are performances and not authentic cultural 
expressions. But if they are just images designed for consumption, that does 
not make them unethical. They are what they are: entertainment for the tourist 
and perhaps a small dose of culture or education. This point emphasizes the 
value of linking quality teaching (e.g., reflexive inquiry into the conditions 
under which identities and stereotypes are constructed) and tourism, rather 
than abandoning either teaching or tourism altogether. Also important are the 
consent of the observed, as discussed above. We recognize that in framing the 
issue of entertainment in this way, we are not addressing recognition justice 
concerns about the unequal ways in which certain groups have the power to 
incentivize underprivileged others to performatively adopt “entertainment” 
roles. This issue, however, brings us beyond the scope of the present essay.
Finally, the last context listed in our taxonomy of voyeurism is instances in 
which people conceive of certain events or images as inherently objectionable 
to observe. Outside of the tourism context, many examples meet this criterion. 
For example, some people consider pornography to be inherently immoral, 
other people consider public executions to be inherently immoral, and, as the 
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recent controversy over the Danish political cartoon of the prophet Muhammad 
demonstrated, some cultures consider depictions of certain religious imagery 
to be profane. 
In the tourism context, several examples are germane. To pick but a 
single salient one, we can note that, according to a BBC News article, some 
Jewish settlers have offered special “terror tours” of the West Bank and Gaza 
where tourists receive training in hand-to-hand combat and weapon use, view 
Palestinian “terror enclaves” from a helicopter and suicide bomber belts that the 
Israeli army seized, and, finally, engage in a paintball fight in a simulated Arab 
village containing simulated Arab terrorists.12 Not only does this practice raise 
questions about how tourism can exacerbate prejudices, but it also prompts 
us to consider whether it is inherently objectionable for people who are not 
journalists or soldiers to take a “tourist” attitude towards warfare. But why are 
actual preparations for real events acceptable, while mock preparations for the 
same events are condemned? People with money and time can put themselves 
through training camps as if they were minor league baseball players, racecar 
drivers, jungle mercenaries, or astronauts. Why not Jewish West Bank settlers? 
Beyond this extreme example, many Israeli kibbutzes offer short-term visits as 
a way to experience “real kibbutz life.” Undoubtedly, some of that experience 
includes anti-terrorism training, formal or informal. If the underlying practice 
is defended solely on a ground of strict necessity, then the tourist may be 
acting unethically absent such necessity. But in most cases, necessity is not the 
explicit or implicit justification, and the ethical distinction between tourist and 
participant fades.  
Conclusion
We do not defend all or even most poverty tourism practices. As noted in the 
introduction, empirical work may find that most poverty tours are ethically 
objectionable as voyeuristic experiences. Our delimited task has been to bring 
some taxonomic order to the debate, and to resist categorical condemnation 
of poverty tours. Hopefully the structure and insights expressed in this 
collaborative paper will help the debates over tourism transition to a mature 
discourse.
Additionally, we hope that our essay will advance inquiry into the 
following question—a question that is broader in scope than poverty tourism, 
12.  To avoid any potential confusion, we would like to note that in appealing to this 
example, we are not taking any side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, we sim-
ply are claiming that if ethical criticism is being leveled at simulations of conflicts, they 
are missing the mark. If the conflicts themselves are morally questionable, then so too 
are the simulations, but only because they perpetuate aspects of conflict, which is the 
proper subject of moral critique. In other words, the moral problem lies in the conflict 
itself, not in the incorrect claim that the simulation (tour) demeans the brutality of war-
fare because it is a simulation (tour).
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but which has been central to the present discussion. In the context of domestic 
and global travel, who has the right to enter another community? Certainly 
a fire truck or ambulance does when it responds to an emergency call. 
Perhaps the President does when touring a disaster area; this visit can be a 
public act of solidarity, not tourism. But what of journalists, social workers, 
artists, documentarians and students? If students are permitted, what possible 
difference could academic credit provide as an ethical justification? Indeed, it 
would seem that if the backpacker in Rio wants equal access to favela tours, 
he or she should not be afforded less liberty than U.S. law students. Such 
interrogatives and observations ultimately prompt the following question: If 
ethical considerations are insufficient to warrant suspending the right to travel, 
do they amount to little more than reflexive reminders to maintain vigilant 
awareness of the complexity and ambiguity that attends to unequally structured 
social encounters?13 
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